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Summary. It is shown, with two sets of survey items that separately load on two distinct 
factors, independent of one another conditional on the past, that if it is the case that at 
least one of the factors causally affects the other, then, in many settings, the process 
will converge to a factor model in which a single factor will suffice to capture the 
structure of the associations among the items. Factor analysis with one wave of data 
can then not distinguish between factor models with a single factor versus those with 
two factors that are causally related. Therefore, unless causal relations between 
factors can be ruled out a priori, alleged empirical evidence from one-wave factor 
analysis for a single factor still leaves open the possibilities of a single factor or of two 
factors that causally affect one another. The implications for interpreting the factor 
structure of psychological scales, such as self-report scales for anxiety and 
depression, are discussed. Some further generalizations to an arbitrary number of 
underlying factors are noted. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Exploratory factor analysis (Thompson, 2004; Comrey and Lee, 2013; Kline, 2014) is 
frequently used to assess the dimensionality of a set of survey items. In many cases, the 
motivation for such an analysis is to allegedly demonstrate that a set of items constitutes a 
unidimensional scale. Such factor analysis is typically carried out with a single wave of data 
collected, i.e. a single time point at which all of the items are assessed. Establishing the 
unidimensionality of a scale is often viewed as an important part of scale development 
(DeVellis, 2016), to be carried about before the scale is employed in longitudinal data 
collection efforts. 
It is well-known that one cannot typically assess causal relations with a single wave of data 
in which data on all variables is collected at the same time (Morgan and Winship, 2015; 
VanderWeele, 2015; Hernán and Robins, 2020). However, the implications of this fact for the 
psychometric evaluation of scales has largely been ignored. If, for example, there are two 
underlying factors that explain a set of survey items, and if these factors are causally related, it 
will not be possible, with a single wave of data, to assess causal relations between them. 
Unfortunately, this has rather serious consequences for attempts to assess factor dimensionality 
with a single wave of data. Specifically, with a single wave of data, it will not be possible to 
distinguish causal relations between the factors from allegedly conceptual relations among the 
items. The present paper formalizes this intuition and discusses the implications for the practice 
of factor analysis.  
 
 
 
 
2. Factor Analysis with Two Causally Related Factors 
 
Consider a standard factor analytic model (Thompson, 2004; Comrey and Lee, 2013; Kline, 
2014), with two sets of survey item responses, (𝑌#$, … , 𝑌'$ ) and (𝑌')#$ , … , 𝑌*$), measured at time 
t, that separately load on two distinct factors, 𝜂#$  and 𝜂,$ , independent of one another conditional 
on past values of the latent factors, 𝜂#$-# and 𝜂,$-#. Suppose, however, that over time at least 
one of the factors causally affects the other, which then gives rise to what is sometimes called 
a dynamic factor model or dynamic structural equation model (Stock and Watson, 2011; 
Shumway and Stoffer, 2017; Asparouhov et al., 2018), as illustrated in Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1. Causal effects of two latent factors on each other over time 
 
 
More generally, if we let 𝑌$ = (𝑌#$, … , 𝑌*$) denote a set of items measured at time t, and 𝜂$ = (𝜂#$ , … , 𝜂/$ ) be a set of m latent factors at time t, then the standard factor analytic model 
with independent errors is given by: 𝑌$ = Λ𝜂$ + 𝜀 
where Λ is an 𝑝×𝑚 matrix and 𝜀 is an 𝑝×1 vector of independent normally distributed random 
variables. For simplicity, assume the variables 𝑌$ have been standardized so that 𝜀7 has mean 
0 and variance 1. Exploratory factor analysis (Thompson, 2004; Comrey and Lee, 2013; Kline, 
2014) attempts to draw conclusions about the dimensionality of 𝜂$ using the observed data 𝑌$. 
While this is in some sense a very specific model, it is the model that is effectively employed 
in thousands of applied papers on scale development (Comrey and Lee, 2013; DeVellis, 2016), 
almost always with data at a single wave i.e. at a single time point t. 
 Now suppose that the latent factors 𝜂$ can change over time and that the components 
may be causally related to each other so that: 𝜂$ = 𝐵𝜂$-# +𝑊$ 
where 𝐵 is an 𝑚×𝑚 matrix with the i-j entry representing the causal effect on factor i at time 
t of factor j at time t-1, and where 𝑊$ is a 𝑚×1 vector of random errors. From this it follows 
that  𝑌$ = Λ𝜂$ + 𝜀 = Λ 𝐵𝜂$-# +𝑊$ + 𝜀 = Λ𝐵𝜂$-# + Λ𝑊$ + 𝜀																							 = Λ𝐵(𝐵𝜂$-, +𝑊$-#) + Λ𝑊$ + 𝜀 = Λ𝐵,𝜂$-, + ΛB𝑊$-# + Λ𝑊$ + 𝜀 
and by iteration: 𝑌$ = Λ𝐵$𝜂< + Λ B=$-#=>< 𝑊$-= + 𝜀 
 Consider now how this process will play out over time in equilibrium, i.e., as 𝑡 → ∞. 
For the process to converge in distribution to some random variable, we must have that the 
matrix 𝐵$ converges as 𝑡 → ∞. Write B in terms of its Jordan decomposition as 𝐵 = 𝑄𝐷𝑄-# 
for some 𝑚×𝑚 invertible matrix Q, where D is an 𝑚×𝑚 matrix of Jordan normal form (Meyer, 
2000). It then follows that 𝐵$ = 𝑄𝐷$𝑄-# and 𝐵$ will converge if and only if 𝐷$ converges. By 
Theorem 1 of Oldenburger (1940), for 𝐷$ to converge as 𝑡 → ∞, it must have, as its limit, 
subject to permutation of indices, a matrix of the form: 𝐷∗ = lim$→H𝐷$ = 𝐼 00 0  
where either the identity or the zeros along the diagonal may possibly be absent. Define 𝐵∗ =𝑙𝑖𝑚$→H𝐵$ then 𝐵∗ = lim$→H𝐵$ = lim$→H𝑄𝐷$𝑄-# = 𝑄𝐷∗𝑄-#. 
We will consider relatively general conditions on 𝐵 and 𝑊$ under which  B=$-#=>< 𝑊$-=  
converges in distribution to some random variable as 𝑡 → ∞, so that the process 𝑌$ will 
likewise converge in distribution. Suppose (i) that at each t, 𝑊$ is independently normally 
distributed with potentially distinct parameters at each t, (ii) 𝐵 is invertible, and (iii) the random 
variables 𝑊$ decay sufficiently quickly over time that B-=$=># 𝑊=  converges in 
distribution to some normally distributed variable 𝑊∗ as 𝑡 → ∞. We may then write B=$-#=>< 𝑊$-= = B$-=$=># 𝑊= = B$ B-=$=># 𝑊= . 
Provided, as above, 𝐵$ converges to some matrix 𝐵∗ as 𝑡 → ∞, we would have B=$-#=>< 𝑊$-= = B$ B-=$=># 𝑊= N 𝐵∗𝑊∗. 
We would then have that 𝑌$ = Λ𝐵$𝜂< + Λ B=$-#=>< 𝑊$-= + 𝜀 converges in distribution to a 
random variable 𝑌∗ given by: 
𝑌∗ = Λ𝐵∗𝜂< + Λ𝐵∗𝑊∗ + 𝜀 = Λ𝑄𝐷∗𝑄-#𝜂< + Λ𝑄𝐷∗𝑄-#𝑊∗ + 𝜀. 
Define Λ∗ = Λ𝑄, 𝜂∗ = 𝐷∗𝑄-#(𝜂< +𝑊∗). In equilibrium as 𝑡 → ∞, the factor model could thus 
be written as: 𝑌∗ = Λ∗𝜂∗ + 𝜀 
and since 𝑄 is invertible, the dimensionality of 𝜂∗ will be rank(𝐷∗),  
 Consider now the special case in which there are exactly two latent factors, 𝜂#$  and 𝜂,$ , 
so that 𝜂$ = (𝜂#$ , 𝜂,$) and B, D, and 𝐷∗ are 2×2	matrices, and recall that D is the Jordan normal 
form of B. If D has the form  𝜆 10 𝜆  
then 𝐷$ will only converge if 𝜆 < 1 (Oldenburger, 1940). However, in that case, 𝐷∗ =𝑙𝑖𝑚$→H𝐷$ = 0. If D has the form  𝜆# 00 𝜆,  
then 𝐷$ will only converge if −1 < 𝜆# ≤ 1 and −1 < 𝜆, ≤ 1	(Oldenburger, 1940). If one of 𝜆# or 𝜆, is less than in absolute value 1 and the other is equal to 1 then 
rank(𝐷∗)=	𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑙𝑖𝑚$→H𝐷$ = 1. If both are less than 1 in absolute value then rank(𝐷∗)=0. 
Thus the only way we can have rank(𝐷∗)=2 is if 𝜆#=𝜆,=1 in which case, D=I and 𝐵 =𝑄𝐷𝑄-# = 𝑄𝑄-# = 𝐼. However, if B is the identity matrix, then it is the case that neither 𝜂#$-# 
affects 𝜂,$ , nor 𝜂,$-# affects 𝜂#$ . If B is the identity matrix, then there are no causal effects of the 
factors on one another. We are thus left with the conclusion that, in equilibrium as 𝑡 → ∞, 
either there are no causal effects of the factors on one another, or if there were, then a factor 
model with a single factor will be sufficient. Note that although the factors constituted by the 
components of the vector 𝜂∗ = 𝐷∗𝑄-#(𝜂< +𝑊∗) may be correlated, if 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘(𝐷∗) = 1 then we 
will be left with only a single factor. Said another way, causal effects of one latent factor on 
another imply that, in equilibrium, if only a single wave of data is collected, a factor model 
with one factor will suffice, even if the true underlying structures are such that there are two 
causally related factors. 
 The implications of this result for the current practice of factor analysis are unsettling. 
Efforts are often made during scale development to demonstrate unidimensionality of a set of 
item responses using factor analysis with one wave of data (DeVellis, 2016). If factor analysis 
provides evidence that a single factor is sufficient to explain most of the covariance in the item 
responses, this is generally deemed satisfactory. However, the argument above indicates that 
this is also exactly the empirical result that one would expect, with one-wave factor analysis, 
if there were in fact two distinct latent factors that causally affected each other over time. With 
a one-wave factor analysis, if there is evidence for more than one factor, then this is genuine 
evidence against unidimensionality. But if a one-wave factor analysis suggests only one factor, 
then we cannot distinguish between the possibilities of two factors with causal effects over 
time versus a single factor. The only way we could establish unidimensionality in this case 
would be if we could rule out, a priori, that, if there were two or more factors, then they 
definitively did not causally affect one another. But it is difficult to imagine circumstances in 
which we were uncertain, on conceptual grounds, about the number of factors, but knew that, 
if more than one existed, then they were causally unrelated. We are left with the conclusion 
that, in many circumstances, alleged empirical evidence for a single factor from one-wave 
factor analysis in fact essentially cannot rule out the possibility of the presence of two factors 
with causal effects. 
 A number of potential objections to the analysis above concerning current factor 
analytic practices might be put forward. First, Figure 1 considers only a relatively simple factor 
model with each item loading only on one of the two factors, and with independent errors. In 
some sense though, this is an ideal case, when one might most expect to be able to discern two 
separate factors from a one-wave factor analysis. And even in this ideal case, one could not in 
equilibrium distinguish the models with a single factor versus two factors that were causally 
related. The algebraic argument above, moreover, did not in fact rely on items loading on only 
a single factor or on independent errors. Even under these more complex structures, if at least 
one factor causally affects the other then the argument above shows that, in equilibrium, a 
factor model with one factor will suffice.  
Second, the argument above also imposed certain assumptions on the matrix 𝐵 and random 
errors 𝑊$. Other, or more general, specifications could be considered. However, this case does 
suffice to demonstrate how causal effects of the factors on one another, can, in equilibrium, 
lead to a reduction in the number of factors that suffice for a factor model to account for 
associations among item responses. The argument did require a decaying structure of the errors 
so as to obtain convergence. Such a model of the errors over time may not always be realistic. 
However, in settings in which exogenous sources of variation are more common earlier in life 
and the variables or states are more stable later in life, such assumptions on the decaying nature 
of the error terms may be a reasonable approximation. Such may be the case with, for example, 
education and the log of total wealth. Each of these may causally affect the other, and while 
either of these can in principle change as time goes on, the likelihood of large increases in 
education, or in total wealth, diminishes substantially by mid-life. Likewise, if lifelong 
trajectories of anxiety and depression are more powerfully shaped by life circumstances, 
experiences, and therapies in childhood, adolescence and early adulthood, and typically over 
time become somewhat more stable by mid-life at either relatively low high or relatively high 
levels psychological distress, still subject to variation but less so, then once again a decaying 
error structure may be a reasonable approximation. 
Third, one might dispute that equilibrium is ever achieved and object that the notion of 
convergence as 𝑡 → ∞, is a theoretical abstraction. However, the limit argument above does 
imply that, if at least one of two factors causally affects the other so that B is not the identity 
matrix, then one can always find a finite number of time steps k, such that 𝐷! is within any 
given arbitrarily small deviation from being either 0 or the matrix  1 00 0  
and thus for there being only very slight deviation from a single factor explaining the set of 
items at time k.  
It is possible that sufficiently prior to convergence being obtained, factor analyses with one 
wave of data could be employed to uncover aspects of the underlying processes. For example, 
under the data-generating structure in Figure 1, prior to convergence, exploratory factor 
analysis, with a sufficiently large sample size, allowing for correlated/oblique factors (e.g. 
using varimax rotation, cf. Thompson, 2004; Comrey and Lee, 2013; Kline, 2014) could 
uncover the fact that the two sets of items loaded on two separate factors. However, an analyst 
who instead employed independent/orthogonal factors would attain an equally good fit with 
two independent factors and all items loading on both factors. The factor model, even 
sufficiently prior to convergence, is unidentified from one wave of data and so it is impossible 
to distinguish between the two solutions. In some sense, each analyst would correctly identify 
some aspect of the underlying processes: the first analyst would correctly identify distinct sets 
of factor loadings, and the second analyst would correctly identify the potential independence 
of the factors (though, at a given wave, they are only independent of each other conditional on 
the past). However, it is not possible to fully identify the correct structure with only one wave 
of data. Again, the causal relationships between the factors renders such identification 
impossible with one wave of data. 
More generally, regardless of the equilibrium argument, and the specification of the error 
terms, it should be clear even from Figure 1 itself, without any further algebra or computation, 
that if there are two factors that causally affect one another, and a factor model is fit with a 
single wave of data, the covariance amongst the item responses will arise both from the 
underlying factor for each item, and from the causal effect of one factor on the other. The model 
with both individual item factor loadings and causal effects across factors is effectively 
unidentified with a single wave of data. There is no way to distinguish the two sources of 
covariance with one wave of data. If there were no causal effects of 𝜂#$-# on 𝜂,$ , nor of 𝜂,$-# on 𝜂#$ , then items 𝑌#$ and 𝑌X)#$  would be statistically independent. In the presence of a causal effect 
of 𝜂,$-# on 𝜂#$ , they will be statistically dependent. It will not be possible to distinguish between 
causal relations among the factors and the allegedly conceptual relations arising from 
underlying latent factors using just one wave of data. 
 
3. Example 
 
Feldman (1993) examined self-report scales for anxiety and depression and employed 
factor analysis to assess whether these self-report anxiety and depression scales measure 
distinct constructs. Based on results from factor analysis with one wave of data she 
concludes, “These analyses provide evidence that anxiety and depression self-report scales do 
not measure discriminant mood constructs and may therefore be better thought of as 
measures of general negative mood rather than as measures of anxiety and depression per 
se.” Similar conclusions were drawn by Norton et al. (2013) in a meta-confirmatory factor 
analysis using data from 28 samples concerning the Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale. 
They conclude that “Due to the presence of a strong general factor, [the Hospital Anxiety and 
Depression Scale] does not provide good separation between symptoms of anxiety and 
depression. We recommend it is best used as a measure of general distress.” 
However, these conclusions ignore the role that causal relationships between the 
phenomena of depression and anxiety may play in these factor analytic approaches. There is 
in fact evidence from numerous longitudinal studies that the experience of anxiety renders 
subsequent depression more likely, and likewise that the experience of depression renders 
subsequent anxiety more likely (Jacobson and Newman, 2017). It is likely that each has 
causal effects on the other. This of course has implications for the interpretation of analyses 
such as those of Feldman (1993) and Norton et al. (2013). If the experience of anxiety causes 
depression, and the experience of depression causes anxiety, or even if just one of these two 
causal relations held, then even if it were the case that the anxiety and depression items 
loaded on distinct anxiety and depression factors, from the results above, one might still 
anticipate, from a one-wave factor analysis, evidence for a factor structure with only a single 
factor. The results of a one-wave factor analysis, such as those of Feldman (1993) and Norton 
et al. (2013), are exactly what one might expect, even if there were two distinct causally 
related factors. Allowing for the possibility for causally related factors, and, in this case, there 
is good reason to expect that possibility, the results of Feldman (1993) and Norton et al. 
(2013) then cannot adequately distinguish between the possibility of two separate factors 
with causal effects versus a single factor. The basic emotions of sadness and fear, underlying 
depressive and anxiety disorders respectively, are arguably clearly conceptually distinct. It 
may well be the case that the only reason the analyses of Feldman (1993) and Norton et al. 
(2013) supposedly indicate that the two cannot be separated is because there are causal 
relations which their analyses cannot assess because they use only one wave of data. 
 
 
4. Some Generalizations 
 
We will now consider some generalizations of the results above, and show that similar 
phenomena may arise with an arbitrary set of k factors. A set of k causally related factors can 
likewise, in a one-wave factor analysis, give rise to patterns of association among item 
responses that, in equilibrium, as 𝑡 → ∞, suggest one factor is sufficient. However, in other 
cases, a set of k causally related factors may give to patterns of association among item 
responses that, in equilibrium, suggest that more than one factor, but fewer than k factors, are 
present. 
Suppose once again that 𝑌$ = (𝑌#$, … , 𝑌*$) denotes a set of item responses measured at time 
t, and 𝜂$ = (𝜂#$ , … , 𝜂/$ ) is a set of latent factors at time t, with the standard factor analytic 
model with independent errors given by: 𝑌$ = Λ𝜂$ + 𝜀 
and suppose that the latent factors 𝜂$ may be causally related to each other so that: 𝜂$ = 𝐵𝜂$-# +𝑊$. 
Under the notation and assumptions of Section 2, we have that, as 𝑡 → ∞, 𝑌$ will converge in 
distribution to the random variable 𝑌∗ = Λ∗𝜂∗ + 𝜀 
where the dimensionality of 𝜂∗ will be rank(𝐷∗) and where 𝐷∗ is of the form: 𝐷∗ = lim$→H𝐷$ = 𝐼 00 0  
with D the Jordan normal form of B. Now let ~ denote an equivalence relation over {1, … ,𝑚} 
defined by 𝑖~𝑗 if and only if there exists {𝑘#, … , 𝑘]} ⊆ {1,… ,𝑚} such that 𝑘# = 𝑖, 𝑘] = 𝑗 and 
for all 𝑟 ∈ {1, … , 𝑣} either 𝐵=a=abc ≠ 0 or 𝐵=abc=a ≠ 0. The distinct equivalence classes of the 
factors indexed by {1, … ,𝑚} are such that no factor in one equivalence class is causally related 
to any factor in any other equivalence class. By permuting indices, one can put the matrix B in 
block matrix form 
𝐵 = 𝐵# ⋯ 0⋮ ⋱ ⋮0 ⋯ 𝐵h  
where each 𝐵X corresponds to the causal relationships among the factors in the rth equivalence 
class. We then have that  
𝐵$ = 𝐵#$ ⋯ 0⋮ ⋱ ⋮0 ⋯ 𝐵h$ . 
For each 𝐵X we can consider its Jordan normal form, 𝐷X, such that 𝐵X = 𝑄𝐷X𝑄-# for some 
invertible matrix Q and we then have 𝐵X$ = 𝑄𝐷X$𝑄-# and 
𝐷∗ = lim$→H𝐷$ = 𝐷#$ ⋯ 0⋮ ⋱ ⋮0 ⋯ 𝐷h$  
For each equivalence class, r, that constitutes only one factor, we have  𝐵X = 𝐷X = (1), and 
this will contribute 1 to the rank of 𝐷∗. For each equivalence class, r, constituted by two factors, 
we have by the argument in Section 2, that this will likewise contribute at most 1 to the rank 
of 𝐷∗since 𝐷X$ can only converge and have rank 2, if 𝐷X itself is a 2×2 identity matrix, in which 
case 𝐵X would be a 2×2 identity matrix, but then each of the two factors would constitute its 
own equivalence class, contrary to the supposition that the two formed a single equivalence 
class. Thus, any equivalence class, r, that is constituted by only two factors, will at most 
contribute only 1 to the rank of 𝐷∗, and will thus, in equilibrium, as 𝑡 → ∞, reduce to at most 
a single factor. Finally, consider an equivalence class constituted by more than 2 factors. 
Suppose that 𝐵X is such that all its entries are strictly positive. It would then follow from the 
Perron–Frobenius theorem (Perron, 1907; Frobenius, 1912; Meyer, 2000) that there is a unique 
eigenvalue with largest absolute value that has an associated eigenspace of dimension 1. By 
Theorem 1 of Oldenburger (1940), for 𝐷X$ to converge as 𝑡 → ∞, all eigenvalues must be less 
than or equal to 1 in absolute value. With a unique eigenvalue with largest absolute value and 
with an eigenspace of dimension 1, it would follow that the Jordan normal form 𝐷X would have 
at most a single entry of 1 on its diagonal, and by Theorem 1 of Oldenburger (1940), for 𝑙𝑖𝑚$→H𝐷X$ to converge, it would have dimension at most 1. Thus, for an equivalence class of 
latent factors wherein each factor in that equivalence class positively causally affects the 
others, this equivalence class will contribute at most 1 to the rank of 𝐷∗ and, in equilibrium, 
will thus reduce to at most a single factor. For an equivalence class of latent factors such that 
some of the factors causally affect other, but not all causal relations are present within the class, 
or for which some factors might negatively affect others, so that the entries of 𝐵X are not strictly 
positive, the dimensionality of 𝑙𝑖𝑚$→H𝐷X$ may exceed 1. There has been some work on relaxing 
the strict positivity requirement of the Perron-Frobenius theorem (Noutsos, 2006) and thus, in 
some of these cases, the equivalence class may likewise only contribute 1 to the rank of 𝐷∗ and 
thus reduce, in equilibrium, to at most a single factor, but this is not always guaranteed by the 
present results. 
Thus, in many cases, each equivalence class, as defined above, will give rise, in 
equilibrium, to at most a single factor. This will always be the case in the models above when 
a factor constitutes its own equivalence class, when an equivalence class has only two factors, 
or when an equivalence class is such that each of the factors positively affects each of the 
others. It may or may not be the case in other settings. However, for one of the most common 
uses of factor analysis – to attempt to establish the unidimensionality of a scale – the 
generalizations here are not in fact needed. A one-wave factor analysis suggesting evidence for 
a single factor could arise from a single underlying factor, or from two causally related factors, 
or from a set of k causally related factors each of which positively affects the other. The central 
point, demonstrated already in Section 2, is that one cannot tell from evidence for 
unidimensionality from a one-wave factor analysis whether there is one factor or whether there 
may be more than one in the presence of causal effects. 
 
 
5. Discussion 
 
The implications of the present work for current psychometric practices are potentially far-
reaching. Factor analysis with one wave of data seemingly cannot distinguish between factor 
models with a single factor versus those with two factors that causally affect one another over 
time. If causal relations between factors cannot be ruled out a priori, alleged empirical evidence 
from one-wave factor analysis for a single factor still leaves open the possibilities of a single 
factor or of two factors that causally affect one another. It would, moreover, as noted above, 
be very unusual for it to be the case that one were uncertain as to the dimensionality of a set of 
factors, but confident that, if there were several, they would be causally unrelated. In most 
cases, we thus effectively cannot distinguish between these possibilities when one-wave factor 
analyses conclude that only one factor is present. This arguably constitutes a substantial portion 
of factor analytic studies. In the models considered above, the conclusion of two factors from 
a one-wave factor analysis would suffice to conclude that one factor is insufficient; but the 
supposed conclusion of one factor does not preclude the possibility of two factors being present 
that are causally related. 
The problems arise because of the inability to distinguish between causation and alleged 
conceptual relationships with one wave of data. It is well-known in statistics, and in the 
biomedical and social sciences, that correlation does not imply causation. The sub-discipline 
of causal inference (Pearl, 2009; Imbens and Rubin, 2015; Morgan and Winship, 2015; 
VanderWeele, 2015; Hernán and Robins, 2020) provides a formal framework to reason about 
the assumptions needed to move from conclusions of association to conclusions of causation. 
Such careful thought helps us avoid the fallacy that “Correlation implies causation.” We might 
refer to this as the “causal fallacy.” Unfortunately, however, a converse fallacy seems to 
typically arise in psychometric measurement evaluation, namely, that “Correlation cannot 
imply causation – it must indicate a conceptual relationship.” This too, of course, is false. 
Correlation does not always indicate a causal relationship, but, sometimes, it does. Sometimes 
correlations arise from causal relationships. As shown in this paper, it is this second converse 
fallacy that underlies dimensionality assessment in most psychometric work on evaluating 
measures. We might refer to this converse fallacy that “Correlation cannot imply causation – 
it must indicate a conceptual relationship” as the “measurement fallacy.” From the discussion 
above, it is arguably the case that this measurement fallacy in fact ought to be treated with the 
same level of critique and skepticism that is appropriately directed at the causal fallacy. Both 
are fallacies. Both fallacies need to be avoided. A fair amount of attention has been given to 
the causal fallacy. However, to date, the measurement fallacy has almost entirely been ignored. 
This needs to change. 
The problems that the present paper makes clear may eventually require re-evaluation of a 
great deal of prior psychometric assessment of scales. It is important to note, however, that this 
does not necessarily imply that the scales themselves are problematic. Many of them may 
indeed have a one-dimensional covariance structure, perhaps especially when the items were 
intentionally chosen with that aim in mind. It is thus unclear how often, and how severely, the 
problems documented in this paper in fact arise in practice with the actual scales that are 
currently being used. However, what does seem problematic is not necessarily the scales 
themselves, but the evidence that has been used to justify them, particularly concerning claims 
of unidimensionality. This may be especially problematic when item responses that, on the 
face of it, would seem to correspond to two or more distinct constructs, are claimed, from one-
wave factor analysis, to be unidimensional. Such was the case with analyses above concerning 
anxiety and depression. 
The way forward with regard to dimensionality assessment for a set of survey items is not 
entirely clear. It is clear that current practices are, in many contexts, flawed in the ways 
documented above. In the presence of potential causal effects amongst factors, almost certainly 
two waves of data collection on all item responses will be needed so as to attempt to disentangle 
causal from supposedly conceptual relationships. However, even with two waves of data 
available, further work would need to be done on the correct analytic approach. Exploratory 
structural equation modeling (Asparouhov and Muthén, 2009; Marsh et al., 2009) might 
provide a potential way forward as it allows for multiple waves of data, data-driven 
dimensionality assessment, and the specification of potential causal effects. It is possible that 
with two waves of data, if one were to impose time-invariant loadings and allow the factors at 
each wave to affect the other factors one wave later, but impose no other assumptions beyond 
standard linearity/normality, that this would suffice to correctly identify that, at wave 2, two 
factors independent of each other conditional on the past were present, with the two sets of 
items loading on separate factors. Intuitively, it might, in this way, be possible to use the 
associations between the wave 1 and wave 2 item responses to try to infer the causal relations 
among the factors, and then effectively use the correlations amongst item responses at wave 2, 
once the causal effects are ‘netted out’, to try to infer the underlying factor structure and factor 
loadings. This would, however, require further development and evaluation of the conditions 
under which such an approach would lead to correct identification of the underlying causal and 
factor analytic structure. 
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